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ABSTRACT
Translating Fourth Amendment rules designed to regulate searches
and seizures of physical property into rules that regulate digital
investigations raises numerous questions. This Note seeks to address one
narrow subset of the issues digital evidence collection presents: the
execution of computer searches conducted pursuant to warrants, and the
threat of general searches-searches effectively unlimited in scope by the
warrant they raise. Both courts and academics have called attention to
this risk of general searches, and many have proposed solutions that seek
to preserve the Fourth Amendment's traditional balance between
individual privacy and government need. However, a single workable rule
remains elusive. While the proposed solutions do not provide answers in
every context, many of the rules do have merit in specific factual
situations. At least while digital technology continues to change at a
rapid pace, lower courts should be encouraged to develop a toolbox of
rules to address the problem. Reviewing courts should take the lead,
exploring the contours and boundaries of the problem and developing
diferent tools in various factual contexts through the process of common
law decision-making.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, computers have increasingly become an
unavoidable part of everyday life. Since 1984, the number of U.S.
households with a computer has grown more than eight-fold to sixty-six
percent of all homes.' Over the last ten to fifteen years, courts and legal
academics have been responding to this trend with increasing regularity,
struggling to apply Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the new contexts
presented by these omnipresent tools.
2
Translating Fourth Amendment rules designed to regulate searches and
seizures of physical property into rules that regulate digital investigations
raises numerous questions.3 This Note seeks to address one narrow subset
of the issues digital evidence collection presents: the execution of
computer searches conducted pursuant to warrants, and the threat of
general searches-searches effectively unlimited in scope by the
warrant-they raise. Both courts and academics have called attention to
this risk of general searches, and many have proposed solutions that seek
to preserve the Fourth Amendment's traditional balance between
individual privacy and government need. However, a single workable rule
remains elusive. While the proposed solutions do not provide answers in
every context, many of the rules do have merit in specific factual
situations. At least while digital technology continues to change at a rapid
pace, lower courts should be encouraged to develop a toolbox of rules to
address the problem. Reviewing courts should take the lead, exploring the
contours and boundaries of the problem and developing different tools in
various factual contexts through the process of common law decision-
making.
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States: August
2000, 1-2 (2001), www.census.gov/prod/200Ipubs/p23-207.pdf; see also U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Telecommunications Report, Broadband Deployment
Is Extensive Throughout the United States, but It Is Difficult to Assess the Extent of
Deployment Gaps in Rural Areas, GAO-06-426, II (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/.
2 Orin S. Kerr is among the most prolific of these academics, and has recently published a
number of articles on related topics. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the
New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 280 (2005) (noting that courts have
just begun to interpret the Fourth Amendment differently in computer cases); see also
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REV. 531, 533 n.2
(2005) (collecting cases demonstrating courts' contradictory holdings relating to
computer searches).
3 See, e.g., Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 2, at 533-34.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
In enacting the Fourth Amendment, former colonists were reacting to
the outrages and abuses they had experienced under the British in the form
of general warrants and writs of assistance. General warrants permitted
searches and seizures without requiring individualized suspicion or
describing the persons or items to be seized.4  Such warrants were
frequently issued to suppress political dissent both in England and in the
American colonies; they authorized searches and seizures of all "trunks,
studies, cabinets, and other repositories of papers" for evidence of
seditious libel.5 As Crown officials issued the warrants ex parte and as
they had the effect of immunizing the officers who executed them against
civil trespass suits, 6 general warrants were especially threatening to the
colonists. The 1763 English case Wilkes v. Wood,7 perhaps the most
famous case in late eighteenth century America, "was the paradigm search
and seizure case for Americans" 8 and likely influenced the drafting of the
Fourth Amendment. 9  In that case, Secretary of State Lord Halifax
attempted to enforce the seditious libel laws against John Wilkes, a critic
of King George III and an outspoken member of the House of Commons,
by issuing a general warrant against him.' 0 Wilkes sued, the general
warrant was declared null and void, and a civil jury awarded Wilkes
£4000 in punitive damages." Reacting in part to this famous case, the
Framers imposed strict limits on the scope of warrants.
12
Writs of assistance-specialized forms of general warrants-
authorized British customs officers to enter houses and shops without
4 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868, 17 (2006).
5 NELSON B. LASsoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 31 (1937).
6 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 771-72
(1994).
7 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (C.P. 1763), 98 Eng. Rep. 489.
8 Amar, supra note 6, at 772 (emphasis omitted).
9 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 65-66
(1998).
10 Id. at 67; Amar, supra note 6, at 772; Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment,
Boston, and the Writs ofAssistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 65 (1996).
n Amar, supra note 6, at 781; Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, supra note 10, at 65.
12 AMAR, supra note 9, at 73.
2007-2008
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probable cause or individualized suspicion in search of untaxed goods
such as tea and sugar. The writs additionally authorized officials to
commandeer peace officers or citizens to assist with the execution of the
warrant. 13 While writs of assistance did not immunize officials who failed
to discover contraband in the same way general warrants did,
14
enforcement of the writs still generated resentment among the colonists.
This eventually erupted into violent opposition in the form of the Stamp
Act riots of 1761.'5
The Framers of the Bill of Rights designed the Fourth Amendment to
assuage fears that the new American government would have similar
powers. 16 The Amendment prohibited general warrants by mandating a
demonstration of probable cause and by requiring particularity-the
limitation that the warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 17 The Amendment
additionally required that every search and seizure be "reasonable."'
18
With the Supreme Court's interpretative guidance, most notably since
the Warren Court era, the Fourth Amendment has offered substantive
protection against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures and
general warrants. The Court's first major step in making the Fourth
Amendment's protections broadly felt was to apply them to the states
through the incorporation doctrine in Wolf v. Colorado.19 Then, in Mapp
v. Ohio, the Warren Court applied the Fourth Amendment's existing
enforcement mechanism, the exclusionary rule, to the states as well.2 °
Around this time the Court also shifted its understanding of the boundaries
of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Previously, the Fourth
Amendment had only extended its protection to physical trespass, but in
Katz v. United States the Court declared that
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
13 Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, supra note 10, at
77-78.
14 [d at 79-80.
15 TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 26.
16 LASSON, supra note 5, at 99-105.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
18 Id.
19 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'o 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.2'
In Katz, the Court held that electronic surveillance of a phone
conversation made in a closed telephone booth required a warrant.
With Katz, the Court adopted an approach that considered whether
a person "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy"
and whether that expectation is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable"' in order to determine the applicability
of the Amendment. 22 This extended the protections of the Fourth
Amendment beyond instances involving trespasses to physical
boundaries, and indicated a willingness of the Court to adapt its
application of the Constitution to the "mischief' born of "[t]he
progress of science.,23
The Court also developed various exceptions to and
elaborations on these Fourth Amendment protections. The two
that have become especially relevant to computer searches are the
plain view doctrine and the closed container rule. The plain view
doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement, permits officers
to seize items not described with particularity in a warrant if the
officer is lawfully in the location where the evidence is seized, the
object itself is in plain view, and its incriminating nature is
"immediately apparent."2 4  Thus it applies broadly, justifying
seizures even where there is no underlying warrant or search. The
closed container rule cuts in the other direction. Courts limit the
scope of a search, preventing it from becoming impermissibly
overbroad, by permitting a search only of those closed containers
that could reasonably hold items described in the warrant.
25
Courts have struggled over how to apply both rules to computer
2 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
22 Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Daniel J. Solove, The Coexistence of
Privacy and Security: Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 749-51 (2005) (listing the
extension of the Fourth Amendment's jurisdictional reach, the application of the
exclusionary rule to the states, and the expansion of the Amendment's applicability
beyond physical trespass as the factors that effectuated the Fourth Amendment's rise to
prominence in the regulation of criminal investigations).
23 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
25 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-24 (1982).
2007-2008
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searches, and have come to widely varying answers, leading to
similarly divergent results.
26
11. GENERAL SEARCHES: THE PROBLEM WITH DIGITAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Computers present a special problem to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: courts are unsure how to conceptualize them in relation to
existing Fourth Amendment rules. In the context of digital evidence
collection, seemingly intuitive answers to these questions "often lead to
astonishing results" that "permit extraordinarily invasive government
powers to go unregulated in some contexts." 27  Some courts have
struggled to analogize computers to closed containers. Under this
approach, the physical computer is a container,28 and all electronic data
stored therein are fairly searchable if agents have an otherwise valid
warrant to search for any single document that might reasonably be stored
electronically. When an investigator accesses the computer, she is
opening a container, and exposing its contents to plain view. Other courts
have instead viewed individual electronic files as closed containers,
theorizing that because agents must open each file to search its contents, a
search of file names in a computer directory does not place the files'
contents in plain view. 29 Under this theory, only the name of the file itself
is in plain view when an investigator begins a computer search.
The scope of warrants authorizing computer searches has engendered
similarly contested analogies. Both defendants and the government have
invoked comparisons of computers to file cabinets in challenging or
defending against an overbroad search or seizure.30  Under traditional
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts have authorized the search, and
26 Compare People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145,153-54 (Colo. 2001) (equating computers to
containers and permitting search of them when "writings" were among other items
enumerated in a search warrant) with United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir.
2001) (rejecting analogy comparing computer equipment to storage containers for
physical documents or objects, such as file cabinets and dressers, because "computers
that are able to hold the equivalent of a library's worth of information[] go beyond the
established categories of constitutional doctrine").
27 Kerr, supra note 2, at 280.
28 United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001).
29 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
30 Id. at 1274-75 (rejecting government's comparison of a computer to a file cabinet,
which the government argued would have made a search of the contents of the entire
computer permissible); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 15, 1993,
846 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quashing a subpoena for over-breadth when it
demanded a corporation provide the investigating grand jury with the central processing
unit of computers used by various officers and employees of the corporation).
7
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sometimes the removal, of entire file cabinets during searches, though
"wholesale removal" is generally not condoned.3 1 The government has
used this jurisprudence to argue that agents have the authority to search
the entire contents of a computer, or to seize computers and other
electronic storage equipment for later off-site searches. 32  Others have
used the analogy to limit the reach of the government, arguing that the
intermingled documents doctrine necessitates the use of scope-limiting
search protocols. This approach acknowledges the practical reality that
there will be some instances where it is infeasible for law enforcement
agents to search for documents responsive to a valid warrant at the site of
the search. In these cases, where responsive documents are so
"intermingled" with documents that otherwise could not validly be seized,
officials may be permitted to remove all the documents for a later search
off-site. 33 Although the seizures in these cases are overbroad, courts will
permit them based on concerns of practicality. 34 However, courts may also
impose limits on the scope of the searches.
For example, in United States v. Tamura, the leading intermingled
documents case, the court recognized that "the wholesale seizure of
documents for later detailed examination of records not described in a
warrant is significantly more intrusive, and has been characterized as 'the
kind of investigatory dragnet that the Fourth Amendment was designed to
prevent.' 35 The Tamura court relied in part on language in Andresen v.
Maryland that "there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant
authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers that are not
necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects."
36 This is because in searches of papers, "it is certain that some innocuous
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.,
37
31 See, e.g., United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (4th Cir. 1987).
32 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272.
33 United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Shilling, 826 F.2d
at 1369-70. The leading treatise on criminal procedure and the American Law Institute's
Model Code also endorse this procedure. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §
2 (2d ed. 1987 & 1994 Supp.); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.5 (1975).
34 Shilling, 826 F.2d at 1369-70.
35 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595 (quoting United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir.
1980)).




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/4
DIGITAL SEARCHES, GENERAL WARRANTS
In interpreting the Fourth Amendment, courts attempt to maintain a
balance between the protection of individual citizens' privacy and the
necessity of the government to discover evidence and prosecute crimes.
38
The large scale seizures necessitated by the practical realities of
intermingled documents threaten to upset this balance. To address this
problem, the Tamura court developed a procedure limiting the scope of
searches where government agents have already taken possession of the
documents. The court suggested that agents who seal and hold the
documents pending the approval of a magistrate for a further search will
likely avoid Fourth Amendment problems. 39 If the magistrate determines
that the seized documents "'constitute books, diaries, or other documents
containing matter not specified in the warrant"' she will "'specif[y] such.
conditions and limitations on the further search . . . as may be
appropriate to prevent unnecessary or unreasonable invasion[s] of
privacy"' or order the documents returned.4 °
Originally, the intermingled documents doctrine remained fairly
limited in application. The Tamura court itself envisioned that situations
necessitating the procedure would be "comparatively rare," 41 and courts
tended to limit its applicability to a few cases involving searches of
thousands of documents.42 However, the heightened capacity for storing
intermingled documents presented by computers, combined with the
omnipresence of computers in contemporary life, suddenly gave this
doctrine a new and different significance.
No longer merely word processors or data aggregation tools,
computers now function as diaries, photo albums, stereos, telephones,
desktops, file cabinets, waste paper baskets, and televisions. Computers
have storage capacities greater than ever before: today, most basic
personal computers come with at least eighty gigabytes of storage,43 the
38 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) ("On one side of the balance [of
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement] are arrayed the individual's
legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's
need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.").
39 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595-96.
40 Id. at 596 n.3.
41 Id. at 595.
42 See, e.g., id. (seizing eleven boxes, thirty-four file drawers of documents, and
seventeen drawers of cancelled checks following search of an office for evidence of
bribery, mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, racketeering, and Travel Act violations); United
States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1987) (seizing "entire file cabinets"
following search of a residence for evidence of income tax violations).
43 PC World, How To Buy a Desktop PC, Sept. 12, 2007,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 125649-page,3-c,desktops/article.html#.
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equivalent of forty million pages of text or eighty thousand books. 44 In
addition to storing the documents and files users consciously save,
computers also typically record "metadata"-information about the
creation and modification of documents-as well as data deleted by the
user, which investigators may be able to recover fully or partially.
45
Computers also store information about the websites a user has visited on
the Internet.46 With sixty-six percent of all homes in the United States
containing computers, 47 and their massive ability to retain information for
and about their users, courts have become increasingly concerned about
balancing privacy interests against the government's need to search
electronic storage devices.
48
In a groundbreaking article, Raphael Winick recognized the rapidly
expanding threat of generalized warrants that computer searches presented
and argued that courts should apply Tamura's procedure for intermingled
paper documents to computer searches. 49 He realized that the danger the
Tamura court saw in relation to file cabinets storing hundreds or
thousands of documents becomes that much greater when considering
computers with storage capacities of millions of pages of text. In
response, Winick suggested expanding on Tamura by recommending that
after seizing a computer, officers "should be required to specify which
types of files are sought.', 50 Law enforcement agents can, he suggested,
outline the methods they will use to sift through the electronic data, and
present them for approval by a magistrate. Use of key word searches,
44 WiseGeek, How Much Text Is in a Kilobyte of Megabyte?,
http://www.wisegeek.com/how-much-text-is-in-a-kilobyte-or-megabyte.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2007).
41 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Search and Seizure of Computers and Electronic
Evidence: The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A
Perspective and a Primer, 75 Miss. L.J. 193, 269-70 (2005) (noting that "deleted"
documents may not be erased from a computer's hard drive until the drive is reformatted,
and that even then investigators may still be able to recover documents or portions of
documents); Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
171, 174 (2006).
46 People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 162 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
47 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1, at 1-2.
41 See infra note 52.
49 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 75, 105 (1994).
50 Id. at 108.
2007-2008
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directory and file lists, and file types may aid officers in formulating their
search protocols.51
As computer ownership and use increased, the heightened threat of
overbroad searches began to register with the courts. 52  They started
responding to these concerns by applying rules designed for physical
searches to digital storage devices, many of them adopting the approach
advocated by Winick. The Tenth Circuit became the first court to
recommend this procedure in Carey v. United States.
53
In Carey, the court expressed its concern that due to the ubiquity and
immense storage capacity of computers, digital searches require a "special
approach ' 4 to avoid the dangers of becoming generalized . The court
considered whether a warrant authorizing a search for narcotics imposed
any limit on the computer files agents could open. The detective involved
in the Carey search began his examination of the defendant's computer by
conducting key word searches of text files, as he looked for evidence
relating to suspected drug crimes. 56 When this method failed to uncover
evidence, he looked through the computer's file directories, where he
discovered a JPG file. Upon opening it, he immediately saw that it
contained an image of child pornography. The detective then downloaded
over two hundred more JPG files, opening many of them in order to verify
51 id. at 107-08.
52 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp.
11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quashing a subpoena for any computer used by specified officers
and employees of the subpoenaed corporation for being "overly broad"); see also United
States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that "[i]n this era
of rapid technological change" "[t]he contours of ... protections in the context of
computer searches pose difficult questions"); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d
574, 583 (D.Vt. 1998) ("Computer searches present the same problem as document
searches-the intermingling of relevant and irrelevant material-but to a heightened
degree."); People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 156 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (noting
that "because computers are different from writings, both in degree and in kind, ...
[b]oth the seizure of a computer and the search of a computer's data are separate and
serious intrusions of individual privacy" requiring special protections).
53 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
54 Id. at 1275 n.7.
55 Other courts have echoed the call for a "special approach" or have characterized
computer searches as "unique." See United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Barbuto, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25868, No. 2:00CR197K, at
*10 (D. Utah Apr. 12, 2001); see also Gall, 30 P.3d at 161 (Martinez, J., dissenting)
(calling for a "specialized approach" due to the differences between computers and
''writings and containers of writings").
56 Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999).
11
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that they contained similar images. Only then did he return to his search
for evidence of drug transactions.
5 7
The defendant moved to suppress the images of child pornography,
arguing that because the warrant only permitted the officers to search for
computer files containing "'names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts,
addresses, and other documentary evidence relating to the sale and
distribution of controlled substances,"' the search of his computer for
child pornography transformed the warrant into a general warrant, and
resulted in an illegal general search. 58 The government responded by
comparing a computer search to the search of a file cabinet, arguing that
just as if it had found the images in a valid search of a file cabinet for
paper documents, the images fell under the plain view exception.5 9 The
Carey court rejected this argument, instead imposing a subjective intent
test. The court held that every image except the first should be suppressed.
This first image the detective had discovered inadvertently, but the other
images were the product of an unauthorized search for illegal
pornography; the detective had "temporarily abandoned" his search for
evidence of drug trafficking. 60 Instead, he should have obtained a second
warrant authorizing his search for the other images.
61
The Carey court continued by declaring that reliance "on analogies to
closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to 'oversimplify a
complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of
massive modern computer storage."' 62 Instead, it recommended that courts
acknowledge that computers contain intermingled documents and adopt
the Tamura court's procedure, as applied to computers by Winick 63 (the
"Carey-Tamura" approach). It was this application of the intermingled
documents doctrine that the Carey court described as the required "special
approach. ,
64
The Tenth Circuit clarified this meaning in United States v. Campos.
65
In Campos, law enforcement agents obtained a warrant to search the
57Id
581Id. at 1270, 1271-72.
59 Id. at 1272.
60 Id. at 1273.
61 id.
62 [d. at 1275.
63 Id.
64 
[d. at 1275 n.7.
6' 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (lOth Cir. 2000).
2007-2008
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defendant's computer for images of child pornography after they received
information from a man alleging that the defendant had sent him two
images of child pornography via email.66 The agents obtained a warrant to
search the defendant's computer for "items relating to child
pornography," 67 and recovered a total of eight images, including the two
originally provided by their informant.68  The defendant moved to
suppress the additional six images, arguing that the search was overly
broad and should have been restricted to just the original two images. The
court held that, unlike in Carey, the officers' search here had remained
properly within the scope of the warrant. However, the Campos court
added the same caveat as did the court in Carey, that a "special approach"
necessitating an "intermediate step of sorting various types of documents"
may be required when computers contain intermingled documents. 69 The
Campos and Carey opinions make clear that, to the Tenth Circuit at least,
a "special approach"-meaning a file sorting requirement-may be
necessary to protect against general warrants.
70
Other courts have developed different rules to address the unique
dangers to privacy presented by digital searches. Some courts have
interpreted the particularity requirement to require a description of the
evidence sought rather than the computer hardware that stores that
evidence.71 Alternatively, courts have required that the warrant specify
66
[d. at 1145.
67 Id. at 1147.
61 Id. at 1146.
69 id.
70 Another Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Walser, also supports this view. 275 F.3d
981 (10th Cir. 2001). In Walser, the court held that officers had properly opened an AVI
file that contained a child pornography video, even though according to the warrant the
officers were authorized only to search for evidence of drug possession and transactions.
The court explained that the agent had seized the defendant's computer and searched it
using a "specific methodology" during the course of which he happened to open the AVI
file. Id. at 984. At that point, the officers sought a warrant specifically authorizing a
search for child pornography. Id. at 985. The court acknowledged that "key differences"
apply to searches of computers, as they are "able to hold the equivalent of a library's
worth of information." Id. at 986. In computer searches, officers are more likely to
encounter intermingled documents, and thus a greater risk of invasion of privacy exists.
Here, however, the court found that the agent conducting the search had met Carey's
requirements by using a "clear search methodology," not a wholesale "rummaging." Id.
at 987.
71 See Ark. Chronicle v. Easley, 321 F. Supp. 2d 776, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding
that a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of "virtually every piece of computer
equipment, computer file or document" in a home "essentially amounted to a general
warrant giving police the authority to rummage through every single computer file and
document with no limitations").
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"the purpose for which the computers were seized ' 72 in order to impose
limits on the search. A district court has developed an approach that treats
folder labels, but not folder contents, as being in plain view, limiting the
folders an investigator may validly search to those with either ambiguous
or clearly responsive names. 73 A New York state court took a similar
approach, stating that police did not have the right pursuant to their
warrant to open a digital folder based on the folder's label, when that label
clearly indicated the folder contained data that was unresponsive to the
warrant. 74 Other courts have required investigators to use more
technologically advanced search methods at their disposal when there was
some indication that those methods would be sufficient to capture the
needed evidence. 75 Because, however, the Carey-Tamura approach has
been one of the most widely cited and criticized of the judicial
innovations, I will focus primarily on that rule in the discussion below.
IV. AN ELUSIVE SOLUTION
Like courts, legal scholars have offered proposals for how to apply
Fourth Amendment protections to digital sources. Some advocate their
own "special approach" 76 while others deny that their solutions are
"special" at all, but rather mere applications of traditional Fourth
Amendment rules to the digital context.77 Regardless of how they are
framed, the commentators share both a concern that digital searches
conducted pursuant to warrants contain a heightened risk of governmental
72 See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998).
7, See United States v. Stierhoff, CR No. 06-042-ML, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18846, at
*73-74 (D.R.I. Mar. 13, 2007).
74 People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800, 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (suppressing evidence
discovered after investigators opened a digital folder when its name "clearly indicated
that it likely contained false identification documents rather than documents or records"
within the scope of the warrant).
75 In re Grand Jury Supoena Duces Tecum Dated November 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11,
13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quashing a subpoena for being overly broad when the government
"acknowledged that a 'key word' search of the information stored on the devices would
reveal 'which of the documents are likely to be relevant to the grand jury's
investigation'); see also People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 166 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]earches may be limited to avoid searching files not included in the
warrant by 'observing file types and titles listed in the directory, doing a key word search
for relevant terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the memory."').
76 Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 280.
77 Clancy, supra note 45, at 195; Daniel J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations
on the Execution of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 841, 842 (2005).
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intrusion and a belief that none of the judicial rules applied thus far are
satisfactory. This dissatisfaction has prompted each to offer his own
proposal. Unfortunately, as of now no single proposal has adequately
solved the problem posed by digital searches. The inability of both courts
and commentators to develop a generally applicable rule demonstrates the
complexity of the problem and its resistance to any one solution, at least
with our current state of technology. However, the flaws exhibited by the
proposed rules demonstrate that it is important to explore the issues
presented by digital searches more completely before rushing to
constitutionalize or enact any such rule. These flaws also indicate that a
single, ideal rule is likely not forthcoming from courts, Congress, or legal
academics. Instead, the lower courts should continue to innovate,
developing new rules that may not be generalizable to all contexts, but
may take the increased dangers presented by digital searches into account
in contextually appropriate ways.
The Carey-Tamura method, one of the earliest and most frequently
applied by the courts, has received the most attention from commentators
who have voiced dissatisfaction with existing approaches. While some
courts continue to cite Carey and advocate its approach,78 commentators
have almost uniformly criticized it. Despite these criticisms, however, the
Carey-Tamura approach could still provide a helpful tool in reducing the
threat of generalized searches in some contexts.
79
There are three major criticisms of the Carey-Tamura rule, each of
which is valid in many, but not all, factual contexts. The first, levied by
Professor Orin S. Kerr, has focused on the method's ex ante restriction
requirement. 80 According to Kerr, the process required by the Carey-
Tamura approach is flawed for the very practical reason that "computer
forensics is contingent, fact-bound, and quite unpredictable." 81  An
investigator will not know beforehand which operating system is on the
device to be searched, which software is on it, or whether the suspect
attempted to hide or disguise any incriminating files. An analyst will
71 See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 965 n.Il
(9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 n.14
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000); In re Search of 3817 W. West
End, First Floor Chi., Ill. 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961 (N.D. I1. 2004); People v.
Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 161 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
79 Similarly, while not discussed here, other court-developed rules that are not workable
in all cases may be able to provide important protections in some factual contexts. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Supoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 13
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that the government had acknowledged that use of a key word
search would have been sufficient to locate documents relevant to the investigation).
'0 Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 2, at 575-76.
"' Id. at 575.
15
TREPEL: DIGITAL SEARCHES, GENERAL WARRANTS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 120 (2007)
therefore not know which forensic tool is best suited to her search until
she begins her examination of the files. She will have a difficult time
deciding on a protocol ex ante, and the magistrate to whom she applies for
a warrant will have even less of an idea about how to evaluate her
recommendation.8
2
A second practical objection to the Carey-Tamura method derives
from the same phenomenon that is driving increasing concerns about the
general nature of computer searches: the rapidly growing storage
capacities of computers and other electronic devices. 83 When Raphael
Winick first proposed applying Tamura's intermingled document
procedure to computers, a typical home computer could store the
equivalent of about 100,000 typewritten pages. 84 Hard drives in typical
home computers sold today are over 800 times larger, and can contain the
equivalent of forty million typewritten pages. 85 When even average-sized
hard drives hold such large numbers of documents, having a magistrate
review file directories becomes highly impractical.
A third common criticism of the Carey-Tamura screening mechanism
is that it assumes the file names the magistrate reviews accurately reflect
the contents of the files. The problem here is that criminals with an
incentive to hide evidence are unlikely to name files in ways that lead
investigators directly to them. 86 Not only can they give files innocuous
sounding titles (for example "Johnny's Science Fair Project" lacks the
malevolent ring of "SexyTeenPics"), but suspects with something to hide
can also easily change the extensions under which files are saved. Thus,
someone attempting to disguise a spreadsheet detailing ill-gotten profits
might label it with the extension .jpg, indicating that it is an image file
instead. Conversely, someone trying to disguise images of child
pornography could label his digital contraband with .doc extensions.
87
While there are valid objections to the specific special approaches that
have been offered by the courts, as most clearly illustrated by the Carey-
Tamura approach, valid critiques may also be made of the proposals
offered by academics. Although each of the commentators has proposed
fixes that acknowledge the potential dangers presented by digital evidence
searches, 88 none of their rules offers a universal solution. One proposal,
82 Id. at 575-76.
8, See Ziff, supra note 77, at 860.
84 Winick, supra note 49, at 81.
85 See WiseGeek, supra note 44.
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advocated by Thomas K. Clancy, would treat electronic storage devices
just like other containers.8 9 This approach flows naturally from those who
argue that a "special approach"-i.e. the application of unique procedures
to computers or electronic documents-is unnecessary. But because
Clancy acknowledges the dangers of unlimited searches of computers, he
has proposed focusing instead on "the sufficiency of the allegations of
criminal conduct or the description of the objects sought" 90 as a means of
protecting citizens from excessive governmental intrusion. However, it is
unclear how this will protect people from general searches in practice
when investigators will still be forced to open each computer file to
determine whether or not it is responsive to the warrant.
It is possible, of course, that by suggesting a less effective solution,
Clancy is merely contending that the danger is not sufficient enough to
warrant stronger safeguards. He may believe that the weak protections he
offers will maintain the proper balance between privacy rights and
governmental need. Certainly this is consistent with advocating the
container analogy: computers contain evidence intermingled with other
materials just as diaries, file cabinets, desk drawers, and calendars do.
Despite the heightened risk of intermingling that electronic storage of
documents may present, computers should not merit special rules.
91
It seems too soon to reach such a definitive conclusion. Currently, and
as Clancy himself has noted, "searches of computers for evidence of child
pornography and other sexual exploitation of children make up a
shockingly large percentage of the decided cases." 92 While these cases are
certainly the most common, they are far from the only type of digital
investigations. Until more fact patterns present themselves, these cases
will continue to be the most salient, and the ones decision makers will
likely have in mind when formulating rules. Unfortunately, the
particularly distasteful nature of the crime may unconsciously influence
decision makers (as it may have influenced Clancy) to believe that
stronger protections against general computer searches are unnecessary.
Of course, this is only speculation. However, the fact that the vast majority
of cases have involved similar fact patterns indicates that decision makers
have yet to see the full contours of the computer search problem, and the
full range of threats to individual rights they potentially represent. This
88 See id. at 199 ("Accepting this view does not mean that wholesale searches of data on
computers are permitted."); Ziff, supra note 77, at 869 (noting that his proposal
"responds to concerns, shared by Professor Kerr and [the Carey court], with the grand
scale of computer searches").
89 Clancy, supra note 45, at 217-18.
90 Id. at 200.
91 Id. at 199, 217-18.
92 Id. at 200.
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limited context indicates that courts or legislatures should hold off on
selecting one particular method of regulating digital searches.
A second proposal involves applying existing scope limits to
computers. An officer authorized to look for incriminating documents
would have the authority to open and inspect all digital files, including
those innocuously named, in order to determine whether they are among
those documents authorized to be seized by the warrant. This would be
permissible because in the case of document searches "'it is certain that
some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to
determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be
seized.', 93  The officers' authority to inspect the documents would,
however, "extend[] only so far as necessary to determine if a given
document is within the scope of the warrant." 94 Under this proposal, then,
computer owners would be protected from a general search because
investigators would only have the authority to examine files cursorily-
they would be limited to making a threshold determination about whether
the document was covered by the warrant or not-but their authority to
search would not extend to scrutinizing the document for evidence of
other crimes.
95
This proposal provides little real protection. First, it relies on officers
to police themselves. While it seems reasonable to think that in most cases
practical limitations alone would prevent officers from reading through
every word of every document to search for evidence of other crimes, in
the event that they did uncover evidence of a second crime, courts and
citizens would be forced to rely on only the officers' word that they did so
while conducting a cursory search for evidence authorized by the warrant.
Unlike many search situations, where a court is forced to weigh the
credibility of an officer's statement against that of a defendant or a
witness, most computer searches take place far from the watchful eyes of
the computer owner. Officers seize the computer first, and bring it back to
a forensic laboratory to be searched at the government's leisure. 96 Once
there, the government can create a bitstream image-an exact copy of the
hard drive-and retain it "to mine it for clues without limit."97 Zealous
investigators motivated by the best of intentions-protecting current or
future victims of crime-may find it morally conscionable to go on a
fishing expedition for evidence of crimes about which they may have a
93 Ziff, supra note 77, at 862.
94 
Id
95 See id at 861-65.
96 Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 288.
97 Id. at 300.
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suspicion, but not probable cause, covering up their activities with white
lies in court.98 Because the court will only have the officer's word, even in
the cases where an officer noticed clear evidence of a secondary crime
merely by opening a file, this reliance on the government's say-so will
serve only to erode the trust between law enforcement and the public.
Second, and more importantly, this proposed solution offers no
protection from general searches where the evidence sought is stored in
the form of text documents rather than images. A cursory search acts as a
meaningful limiting device only when the evidentiary value of a document
is apparent at first glance. This will be true for many, but not all,
computer searches. Suspected transmitters of child pornography, for
example, might receive some protection from general warrants under this
theory. As investigators will be opening files looking for illegal images,
they should quickly discard any text or data files as being non-responsive
to the warrant. 99 However, this technique will not provide any protection
from a general search to those accused of crimes where the evidentiary
value of a document is not immediately apparent. An investigator
authorized to search a computer for evidence relating to tax evasion, for
example, may have to scrutinize each and every spreadsheet and document
to determine whether it is responsive.
A third proposal, put forth by Orin Kerr and inspired by his concerns
about the "difficulties [that] arise when [Fourth Amendment] doctrine is
applied to the facts of computer crime investigations,"' 100 would "reject the
plain view rule in the context of digital evidence searches."' 0'1 Eliminating
this rule would render inadmissible any digital evidence discovered
beyond that authorized by the warrant. According to Kerr, such a rule
could be generated either by the courts or by Congress, 10 2 but would likely
need to at least be supplemented with federal privacy statutes.
10 3
" See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1996) ("[E]xisting literature demonstrates a widespread belief
that testilying is a frequent occurrence."); qf Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrest for
Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L.
BULL. 549, 549-50 (1968) (examining data demonstrating that the incidence of testimony
by police that arrestees dropped drugs as the police discovered them increased after the
application of the exclusionary rule to the states, indicating that "the police are lying
about circumstances of arrests" in order to avoid the suppression of evidence).
'9 Conversely, this technique may offer little protection from general searches to
unsuspected child pornographers. When investigators have probable cause to search the
files of those suspected of other crimes, the immediately incriminating nature of images
of child pornography will mean that these files will likely survive a challenge to suppress.
100 Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 281.
101 Id. at 314; Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 2, at 577.
102 See Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 314.
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Practically, this may be the best means for limiting the scope of digital
searches, as current technology has not, to date, presented investigators
with a tool allowing them both to conduct a comprehensive search of
digital files for authorized items while screening out documents not
described in a warrant. This proposal would, however, offer far greater
protection to digital files than Fourth Amendment doctrine provides to any
category of physical evidence. While Kerr has argued that such a rule
might still "best balance the competing needs of privacy and law
enforcement in light of developments in computer technology," even he
has concluded that eliminating the plain view exception is "too severe," at
least at present. 
104
V. THE CASE FOR THE COURTS
Aside from the elimination of the plain view doctrine as applied to
computers, Kerr has more generally advocated for legislatively enacted
rules to address issues of criminal procedure presented by new technology,
rather than reform initiated by the courts.105 Kerr argues that legislatures
possess a significant institutional advantage in creating rules governing
law enforcement investigations using new technologies, at least as long as
these technologies are rapidly changing. 106 According to Kerr, legislatures
are more institutionally competent because they can create rules ex ante
rather than ex post, have greater flexibility, and are better situated to gain
a comprehensive understanding of the technologies at issue. 10 7  While
103 Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 2, at 583.
104 Id.
105 Orin S. Kerr, The Search and Seizure of Computers and Electronic Evidence: Search
Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 Miss. L.J. 85, 88 (2005). While Kerr has
proposed several specific statutory warrant rules that chiefly clarify the translation from
the language of physical investigations to that of the digital, none of these proposed
legislative rules addresses exactly how digital searches of data storage devices can be
narrowed to avoid authorizing general searches. Id. at 127-34. Instead, these rules
aclmowledge the realities of what he has described as the two-step search process for
digital evidence-the process by which investigators search a site for physical evidence,
and later conduct a digital search off-site of any hardware they initially seized. Id. at 86.
For example, Kerr proposes that statutory rules should: (1) require the police both to
describe the type of physical evidence they plan to seize and then the type of evidence
they will search for in the subsequent electronic search; (2) recognize that a Fourth
Amendment search still occurs even when the physical object being searched is a
bitstream copy of the seized data; and (3) provide guidance on when each part of the two
step search process should be executed, and when seized hardware must be returned. Id.
at 127-34; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858-60 (2004).
106 Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Casefor Caution, supra note 105, at 805.
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each of Kerr's arguments might apply to the creation of rules governing
new technologies,' °8 his thesis fails to hold in the context of digital
searches. At least in this context, until a fuller picture of the factual
circumstances in which these searches arise emerges and the implications
that they have for individual rights becomes clearer, lower courts are
better positioned to continue innovating with the application of Fourth
Amendment rules.
This may seem counterintuitive because legislatures enact generally
applicable rules prospectively, rather than waiting to resolve issues as they
arise in the form of cases and controversies, as courts do. Judicially
imposed rules create an undesirable lag between the appearance of new
technologies and the rules that apply to them. This may result in courts
promulgating "unsettled and then outdated rules."' 1 9 Alternatively,
legislatures can proactively provide law enforcement agents with guidance
on new technological issues, addressing potential legal challenges before
they arise in court.
110
Clearly, as indicated by the cases discussed above, the time has
already passed for Congress to provide the courts with ex ante rules for
narrowing searches. These cases have already arrived and been
adjudicated before state and federal courts, and those courts were left to
make decisions ex post, as the specific circumstances arose. Additionally,
even Kerr's premise-that legislatures could have enacted laws to provide
guidance up front-may not apply here. Unlike other technological
concerns, such as the privacy status of e-mail,111 the privacy issues raised
by searches of home computers were likely not immediately apparent to
either Congress or the courts when magistrates first issued warrants
involving digital evidence. Specific cases and controversies, as well as
further technological change in the form of increased storage capacity and
functionality, were required to call attention to these problems. As these
cases have trickled up to the courts, judges and academics alike have
recognized the possibility that such warrants could upset the careful
balance the Fourth Amendment has traditionally struck between the
concerns of law enforcement and privacy. However, the attention has yet
to reach the level of public awareness and concern that it often takes to
107 Id. at 868, 871, 875.
108 But see Solove, supra note 22, at 748 (rebutting Professor Kerr's arguments for the
institutional competence of legislatures over courts in developing Fourth Amendment
rules for new technologies).
109 Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, supra note 105, at 868.
110 Id. at 870.
Id.
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initiate legislative attention."' In such cases, courts cannot and should not
wait for legislatures to act.
Far from being problematic, courts acting ex post may hold the
comparative institutional advantage in this context. When Fourth
Amendment concerns are not immediately apparent, an interstitial judicial
decision-making approach is preferable. One cannot assume that once the
issue has finally come to the attention of the courts that the full contours of
the problem will be visible. Only the examination of many different cases
will illuminate the full depth and breadth of the newly discovered Fourth
Amendment concern. Additionally, in the case of digital searches, not only
were the serious privacy implications not immediately apparent, but no
easy solution to them has been forthcoming either, as the discussion above
should have made clear.
Kerr also argues that legislatures' flexibility gives them another
advantage over courts. Whereas legislatures are free to experiment with
rules and can amend them as needed, courts are bound by stare decisis.
113
However, stare decisis is an obligation that may be "released when
competing public policy beckons persuasively" due to "changed
conditions[,] . . . increased knowledge," or the realization that "the rule
has become unsound in the circumstances of modem life."' 1 4 Indeed, with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, the courts' rules have exhibited a high
degree of flexibility: exceptions "such as Terry stops, exigent
circumstances, and 'special needs' in schools and workplaces" "allow the
courts to accommodate a wide range of government investigative activity
within the protective framework of the Fourth Amendment" while still
balancing privacy interests. 115 And courts have been equally flexible and
creative in coming up with unique requirements in order to narrow the
scope of future digital searches. Reviewing courts have recommended"
16
112 Id; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 144
(1921) ("All history demonstrates that legislation intervenes only when a definite abuse
has disclosed itself, through the excess of which public feeling has finally been
aroused."); M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 566 (1996) ("A statutory answer is not normally sought
until a problem has erupted in the public consciousness, when a social dilemma has
achieved such a level of gravity and tenacity that 'social convention' demands
'community voting."').
113 Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Casefor Caution, supra note 105, at 871.
n4 Madden, supra note 112, at 590 (quoting Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 526 (Md.
1983)); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1921) ("It
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV.").
115 Solove, supra note 22, at 762.
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and authorized 1 7 magistrates' imposition of ex ante search protocols; they
have required the limitation of searches by examining lists of file names"
18
or key word searches; 119 they have treated computers simply as closed
containers; 12 and they have imposed subjective intent tests.121
This spectrum of responses may come from the fact that courts are
forced to make ex post decisions: when presented with a new set of facts,
courts are able to develop or grow the law by applying traditional Fourth
Amendment rules to the new context. "[F]requent encounters with a
general problem, presented in various contexts that an endless variety of
fact patterns provides" allow courts to formulate and test new rules.
122
Additionally, stare decisis acts as less of a binding norm when courts are
suddenly presented with entirely new factual contexts 123 -including those
generated by technological change. In fact, courts may be doing a better
job at providing flexibility in decision-making than legislatures when it
comes to technological issues. Professor Daniel J. Solove notes, for
example, that Congress has failed to enact legislation that keeps pace with
technological developments, and has neglected to update existing
statutes. 124  While Solove's response focuses on electronic surveillance
law, the same can certainly be said for privacy concerns relating to overly
broad computer searches.
It is true that with this type of judicial innovation through common law
decision-making the clarity of the law suffers. However, as Solove
asserts, the values of "flexibility and clarity are often in conflict" and are
"endemic to all rules, whether legislative or judicial., 1 25  With
"' See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 1999); People v.
Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 162-65 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
117 See, e.g., In re Search of 3817 W. West End, First Floor Chi., Ill. 60621, 321 F. Supp.
2d 953, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
11' See, e.g, People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800, 807-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
119 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 15, 1993, 846 F.
Supp. 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
120 See, e.g., Gall, 30 P.3d at 153; United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
121 See, e.g., Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.
122 Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
MINN. L. REV. 265, 297 (1963).
123 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (explaining that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not function as an "inexorable command" when the "facts
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification"); see also supra text accompanying note 114.
124 Solove, supra note 22, at 769.
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technological change, as Kerr suggests, flexibility becomes more
important so that rules can change in response to technological
advances.126 Lack of clarity therefore becomes a practical reality of both
judicial and legislative rulemaking, and a rational tradeoff.
Finally, Kerr argues that the legislative branch has greater institutional
competence for generating Fourth Amendment privacy rules relating to
new technology due to the legislature's ability to gather a comprehensive
understanding of the facts. While reviewing courts are generally limited
in their fact gathering to written briefs and oral arguments, legislative rules
can be the product of hearings with testimony and comments from experts,
advocacy groups, civil liberties groups, and the Department of Justice.
Additionally, the entire process tends to be open to public scrutiny, which
can also influence the end results. 127 The breadth and types of sources
provide the legislature with a clearer understanding of how the technology
actually works, the argument goes.
However, Solove has argued that "there is no reason.., to assume that
the average legislator can better understand technology than the average
judge."' 128 Furthermore, "in many cases, the technologies at issue are not
particularly complex."' 129 Solove asks, "[d]o we really need two years and
thousands of pages of detailed information to understand how e-mail
works?"' 130 The same question can be asked about naming and opening
files on a home computer-the major technological understanding
required to think about digital searches. Any further necessary information
can efficiently be gathered by a quick Westlaw search for Kerr's own law
review articles, which summarize the technology involved at a level even
a Luddite in robes can understand. At least with regard to conceptualizing
the problems involved in limiting the scope of digital searches, the most
important skill is a judicial one: analogizing computer searches to searches
of physical documents or objects, and applying Fourth Amendment rules
in a way that is consistent with that comparison.
The courts, then, rather than the legislature, are the best institution for
reestablishing an acceptable balance between individual privacy and the
needs of law enforcement when technology is in flux, at least for the
particular problem presented by computer searches. 131 Courts have played
125 Id. at 767-68.
126 Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Casefor Caution, supra note 105, at 871.
12 7 Id. at 875, 881.
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this role before with success, adapting the Fourth Amendment to provide
individual protections even in the face of new technologies. Justice
Brandeis recognized that courts can and should play this role in his dissent
in Olmstead, when he wrote, "[c]lauses guaranteeing to the individual
protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity
of adaptation to a changing world.... Time works changes, [and] brings
into existence new conditions and purposes."' 132 Thus, he concluded, "'in
the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be."' 133 The Supreme Court later demonstrated
its capacity to adapt constitutional rules to technological changes in Katz,
when the Court overruled Olmstead. There, the Court rejected the
"narrow" and static view of the Fourth Amendment on which Olmstead
had rested, holding that a warrant was required to eavesdrop electronically
on telephone calls made from a public phone booth.
134
The role of the courts is even more vital in the context of computer
searches. Many courts and commentators have expressed concern over
the lack of a limiting device for computer searches. 135 Without a means of
limiting the scope of searches, otherwise valid warrants have the potential
to become overbroad, authorizing generalized searches. While there is not
yet a judicial consensus that recognizes the privacy dangers inherent in
computer searches, as computers' storage capacities grow and they
become ever more present in our daily lives, this concern is increasing. At
the same time, neither the courts nor the commentators have offered a
silver bullet solution in the form of a generally applicable rule. Each
proposal offers certain advantages, but also suffers from very real flaws.
Each also contains its own inherent conception of the proper balance
between law enforcement needs and privacy concerns. As the technology
continues to change and the courts and the citizens they protect continue to
develop an intuitive sense of a proper balance, common law innovation to
131 According to Professor Melvin Eisenberg, common law judges may legitimately play
a "leadership role" by identifying the community's norms when they are changing or in
flux. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE RATIONALITY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE NATURE
OF THE COMMON LAW 19 (1988).
132 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 474.
134 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Of course, the rule in Katz has
ironically increased police power in some areas, as it has led courts to conclude that
particular police actions do not constitute "searches" in the first place. See, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that the examination by
police of a sealed, opaque garbage bag left on the side of a public street was not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-and therefore not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protections-because a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in discarded items).
135 See supra note 52.
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discover rules that strike that balance is necessary. 136 Courts, rather than
the legislature, are best suited to find this balance.
For example, despite the criticisms of it, the Carey-Tamura approach
would have been an appropriate tool to use in the context presented by
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing.137 That case arose from a
federal investigation into the Bay Area Lab Cooperative (BALCO) on the
suspicion that it was distributing illegal steroids to professional baseball
players. In the course of its investigation, the government obtained
warrants to search two different laboratories that had tested urine samples
of Major League Baseball players. 138 However, the warrant authorized the
seizure of drug test records for only ten named players whose connections
to BALCO had previously been established.139 The warrant authorized the
search of computer equipment for this information as well as the seizure of
the data or the hardware itself. When investigators arrived at
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT), one of the labs, they discovered
that the information covered in the warrant existed in three different
places: a list containing information about the ten named players, a master
list of the drug test results for all Major League Baseball players, and an
electronic directory. That directory, referred to as the "Tracey directory,"
contained over 2900 files including "medical test results for hundreds of
other baseball players and athletes engaged in professional sports."'
140
Investigators seized all three items and then used the seized files to obtain
subsequent search warrants for all baseball players who had positive test
results. 141
While the majority in Comprehensive Drug Testing determined that
investigators lawfully seized the entire Tracey directory because it
contained information intermingled with evidence covered in the
warrant, 142 the dissent argued that the Carey-Tamura procedure would
136 While this Note focuses on the role reviewing courts play in developing a new
common law limiting the scope of electronic searches, magistrate judges also have an
important role to play ex ante, by imposing limitations on the scope of digital searches
when they issue warrants. See, e.g., In re Search of 3817 W. West End, First Floor Chi.,
Ill. 60621, 321 F. Supp, 953, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (upholding the authority of a magistrate
judge to require the government to provide an ex ante search protocol limiting the scope
of computer searches).
137 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006).
138 Id. at 919-20.
13 9 Id. at 921.
141 Id. at 946-47 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 949.
142 Id. at 934-35.
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have been the appropriate means of limiting the examination of personal
medical information outside the scope of the warrant. 143  The dissent
asserted that the court should have imposed a rule requiring the agents to
present the data to a "'neutral and detached"' magistrate" for review. 144 In
the Comprehensive Drug Testing context, this approach seems correct.
Here, the information responsive to the warrant was contained in a single
electronic directory (as well as in two paper documents). The specific
information authorized by the warrant might have been separated out from
the unresponsive, private medical information with the simple expedient
of a key word search or the screening of files by a magistrate. Because the
warrant itself covered only a narrow set of data, and because the agents
found this data almost immediately while still at the CDT lab,145 seizing
vast quantities of unresponsive data was unnecessary. Unlike in many of
the digital search cases, agents had no need to open files one by one to
locate the evidence covered in the warrant. Based on these circumstances,
the objections to the Carey-Tamura approach outlined above do not apply.
Here, the amount of information was not so overwhelming as to make
examination by a magistrate impractical or impossible. Nor was there any
question that the file type or name of the directory was disguised: the
investigators found exactly what they were looking for while on-site at the
lab, without significant delay. 146  Finally, with the search of a single
directory, there was no difficulty imposed by creating a search protocol ex
ante. The magistrate could have culled the responsive data from the
unresponsive without technological know-how; there was no need for
agents to present a magistrate with a step-by-step search plan upfront.
143 Id. at 952 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 965 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 922-23 (majority opinion).
146 Although the government may have been concerned that electronic files are in general
more susceptible to being deleted or disguised, that concern did not appear to come into
play in this specific case. While the government justified removing electronic data and
computer equipment from CDT by averring in the affidavit accompanying its application
for a warrant that "'[c]omputer users can attempt to conceal data within computer
equipment and storage devices through a number of methods"' and "'[c]omputer
hardware and storage devices may contain 'booby traps' that destroy or alter data,"' the
government had no "evidence or reason to believe that CDT had engaged in . . .
boobytrapping computers, or any type of data destruction or alteration." Id. at 960-961
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In fact, the government "had accepted in writing CDT's
assurances 'that CDT will maintain and preserve all materials called for by the first
subpoena as well as any materials called for by the new subpoena' and that 'CDT would
not destroy or alter any of the materials called for by either of the subpoenas."' Despite
the general concerns outlined in the government's affidavit, "there was no suggestion that
CDT was attempting to mislead the government in any respect." Id. at 961 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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It is true that circumstances where the Carey-Tamura approach would
be useful may not be the norm. But as long as the threat of general digital
searches is present, and a universal tool for addressing that threat is not,
the common-law development of useful rules and a context-dependent
selection of the appropriate one may be the best means of protecting the
Fourth Amendment's traditional balance of privacy against governmental
intrusion. It is also true that the lack of a universal rule creates uncertainty
and makes the limits on government power unclear. 147  However, an
interstitial rulemaking approach by the lower courts is useful where a
problem with no easy solution has been identified. The courts can explore
the contours of the problem-adjudicating cases like Comprehensive Drug
Testing where the Carey-Tamura approach might make more sense, along
with others, where the commonly raised objections to that approach have
more traction. Additionally, they can innovate, creating new rules when
entirely new factual or technological contexts arise.
While the uncertainty this approach generates will pose problems for
law enforcement, it will provide incentives that do not now exist for law
enforcement agents to pause before they search and seize
indiscriminately. 148 Law enforcement agents are already functioning in a
world of digital searches without clearly defined rules. Neither the courts
nor Congress has provided clear rules for conducting computer searches.
The Department of Justice has published a handbook that outlines the
basic procedures and issues agents and prosecutors should consider when
planning an electronic search, but these take the form of suggestions for
how to approach searches of computer equipment and data generally-
such as how to draft the warrant and accompanying affidavit-rather than
rules. 149 Instead, law enforcement agents are left with little or no incentive
147 Kerr, The Search and Seizure of Computers and Electronic Evidence: Search
Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, supra note 105, at 861-62.
148 Moreover, once reviewing courts begin to develop a set of rules governing electronic
searches, magistrate judges will increasingly be able to impose scope-limiting search
strategies ex ante, providing additional clarity for investigators.
149 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.pdf. For example, the
handbook explains the differences between warrants to seize hardware and warrants to
seize electronic information, and discusses when and why agents might opt for one rather
than the other. Id. at 61-65. The publication also advises agents to explain their search
strategy and the techniques they plan to use to separate incriminating documents from
commingled documents whenever possible to avoid allegations that the government is
using a warrant to justify a general search. Id. at 73-74. While the handbook cautions
agents to "be particularly careful when seeking authority to seize a broad class of
information," it does not provide specific rules or guidelines for agents to use to narrow
their electronic searches. Instead, it provides practical advice designed to assist agents in
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to limit themselves to searching for evidence described in the warrant. In
Comprehensive Drug Testing, for example, the government agents could
have limited themselves to the information covered by the warrant.
Instead, they both seized and examined the entire Tracey directory for
positive test results from other baseball players, and then used that
evidence to support new warrants. If courts made it clear to investigators
that the Carey-Tamura procedure was a tool they should use when
reasonable, the agents might have considered whether abiding by such a
procedure would have successfully provided them with all the information
they were authorized to obtain, without a concurrent risk of suppression.
Where the courts have been willing to suppress evidence, investigators
have proceeded more cautiously, for example, by going back to obtain a
second warrant in the event they inadvertently uncover incriminating
evidence outside the scope of the original warrant. 150 Furthermore, the
absence of a clear rule has not impeded investigators in the execution of
their original searches. The suppression battle in digital search cases has
generally been waged over evidence outside the scope of the original
warrant; and where the courts have focused on the originally sought-after
evidence, 151 they have been reluctant to suppress that evidence, even when
acknowledging flaws in the warrants. 152 Thus, the lack of clear rules does
not impede the admission of the originally sought evidence.
Public choice theory also supports a judicial approach to the protection
of Fourth Amendment rights in this context. Public choice theorists have
observed that legislative actions are frequently influenced by the efforts of
interest groups to lobby the legislature to enact laws that benefit them at
the expense of the general public. While the laws might harm more
people than they help, the harms they produce are slight compared to the
significant benefits they provide to particular interests. Well-organized
interest groups therefore have strong incentives to lobby for these changes,
while the more diffuse general population has weak incentives to oppose
them, and faces substantial barriers in the form of higher transaction
drafting and executing warrants while avoiding legal pitfalls specific to electronic
searches and seizures. Id. at 62.
150 See, e.g., United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2001).
151 See, e.g., id. at 986-87 (focusing bulk of discussion on the defendant's motion to
suppress child pornography evidence obtained during a search for records of drug
transactions); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 1999) (discussing
propriety of seizure of pornographic images of minors during search for evidence of
hacking).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the
district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence, despite the fact that
the warrant was overbroad); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 585 (D. Vt.
1998) (holding that suppression of evidence was not warranted, even when the section of
the warrant pertaining to the digital evidence was "impermissibly overbroad").
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costs. 153 The judiciary, by contrast, makes its decisions independent of
interest groups' influence. 154  Though generally recognized, this
distinction between the courts and the legislature is more pronounced in
the realm of criminal procedure, and specifically digital evidence
searches. 155  With a statutorily diminished voice in legislative affairs,
criminals are at a greater danger than most for being victims of democratic
failings.
As Donald Dripps has argued, "legislatures systematically undervalue
the rights of the accused."' 156 This occurs because a majority of the voting
public identifies more with crime victims than with criminals. The
interests of voters will therefore align with law enforcement, and result in
the enactment of greater investigative powers or lesser privacy protections.
In the context of computer searches, then, voters will be less likely to
identify with those whose computers are searched, and will tend to support
rules permitting broader searches. While this trend in criminal procedure
may be somewhat mitigated due to the advocacy efforts of technology-
oriented interest groups such as internet service providers, their work may
ultimately have little effect. Instead, this trend of undervaluing the rights
of the accused in criminal procedure may actually become exacerbated
when one considers that most computer search cases have arisen in the
context of child pornography. 157 Voters are even more likely to support
measures that result in the prosecution of child pornographers at great cost
to individual rights. Child pornographers are likely the most vilified and
marginalized criminals, and consequently, make easy targets for
legislators hoping to win votes. Courts, then, will be the institution most
likely to generate balanced rules.
153 See generally Robert D. Tollison, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REv. 339 (1988).
154 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
155 But see Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Casefor Caution, supra note 105, at 884-87 (arguing that public choice insights
"have only limited force in the context of criminal procedure rules" because law
enforcement interests generally align with the public, as both groups generally advocate
for greater enforcement of substantive criminal laws).
156 Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1100 (1993).
151 Clancy, supra note 45, at 200; see also Ziff, supra note 77, at 842.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As we increasingly rely on the conveniences of digital technology,
courts are ever more frequently confronted with the complex
constitutional questions these technologies raise. As many courts have
recognized, the application of traditional Fourth Amendment rules to new
technology-at least in the context of digital evidence searches-has the
potential of eroding the time-honored protections of search warrants.
Unless the procedures for executing digital searches evolve to take the
differences associated with digital investigations into account, warrants
authorizing searches and seizures of digital evidence may become no more
of a check on governmental authority than the general warrants the
American colonists reviled.
Unfortunately, a satisfactory and universal method of modifying
digital search procedures to avoid this outcome does not yet exist.
Although courts and scholars have proposed various means of adapting
traditional Fourth Amendment rules to digital searches, currently none of
the proposals offer a workable, generally applicable rule with sufficient
protections. Eventually, such a rule may become a reality. Still, this
interim period provides an important opportunity. As the technology
continues to change, the factual contexts in which these issues arise will
expand and diversify. An exploration of these diverse contexts will
provide a better sense of the proper balance between individual privacy
and governmental necessity that any rule applying the Fourth
Amendment's protections should seek to provide. But until the full
contours of the issues presented by digital searches become apparent,
courts can and should continue their work, using common law innovation
to apply traditional rules in new ways that provide sufficient Fourth
Amendment protections to digital technology users. Until a "perfect"
solution can be found, these judicially developed rules offer the best
protections against the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights in the digital
world.
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